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Abstract—We introduce a model for a market based economic
system of cyber-risk valuation to correct fundamental problems
of incentives within the information technology and information
processing industries. We assess the makeup of the current day
marketplace, identify incentives, identify economic reasons for
current failings, and explain how a market based risk valuation
system could improve these incentives to form a secure and robust
information marketplace for all consumers by providing visibility
into open, consensus based risk pricing and allowing all parties
to make well informed decisions.
Index Terms—cyber-security, computer security, economics,
free markets, cyber-risk valuation, incentives, information secu-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The current state of cyber-security in the world is abysmal.
Most security experts have little to no confidence in the secu-
rity of even their own computing systems or those employed
by their organizations. The largest nations in the world have
difficulty protecting their most sensitive personnel files and
secrets, the largest film studios can not protect their content
or intellectual property, financial and private web services can
not protect their sensitive customer data and there is no reason
to think any of this will improve under the current incentive
system.
In this document we outline a brief summary of how a
market based risk pricing system could correct the incentives
involved in the cyber-security ecosystem and propose several
potential institutions and market functions which could help to
correct and align interests, risks and equities to help resolve
the shortcomings and market failures of the cyber-economy
as it exists today. This market based valuation of risk solves
the severe difficulties identified in recent work where a single
insurer entity goes to great lengths to conduct risk assessment,
and remains vastly under-informed. [8] [7]
II. MOTIVATION: INCENTIVES IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM
To understand why the system operates the way it does
currently, we must explain the incentive system as it exists
today. To do this we attempt to reduce a complex marketplace
for cyber security into several distinct classes of motivations,
capabilities, and equities. These are outlined below.
Information Product Providers: produce software apps,
hardware platforms and web-based applications that we use
everyday to communicate, store information, process informa-
tion, and generally fill our information access and manipu-
lation needs every day. In many cases these are low margin
industries where price competition for large consumer markets
is key. The market right now incentivizes these information
product providers to provide the best functionality, at the
lowest cost, and fastest delivery to potential buyers who may
be interested. These information product providers genuinely
would love to provide security for their customers, but in
general they can not afford to dedicate sufficient time, money,
and effort into developing their products around security as a
central function without sufficient long term customer demand
to drive this cost benefit equation. If a product succeeds in the
market place, they can afford to attempt to bolt-on security
later, but unfortunately that is generally not how such systems
work, and a ground up approach to security is necessary.
In summary information product providers:
• Seek to fill the customer’s need for functionality, low cost,
fastest delivery
• Seek to provide security for customers but often don’t
know how or can not invest sufficiently upfront into this
focus.
Information Owners, Product Consumers: This con-
stitutes all of us. Each of us participates in email, text
messaging, calling, storing documents, filing taxes, online
banking, online investment, and any number of information
operations which allow us to function efficiently every day
through electronic means. To accomplish this we must choose
hardware to operate on, be they computers, smartphones, or
tablets, we must choose an operating system, a browser, a
series of applications, websites and online services with whom
we entrust our information and privacy to accomplish these
tasks. Often the decisions on which platforms, software, or
services to use are centered around cost decisions, familiarity,
ease-of-use, performance criteria, product features, visual user
interface features, or other such factors. Some people are
heavily security conscious when making such choices, but the
vast majority of users either rank security and privacy lower
in their priority list, or more likely are not informed enough
to be able to properly evaluate security features and risks in
terms of their decisions. In summary information owners
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Figure 1. A simplified diagram of the economic cycles present in the current day cyber-security ecosystem demonstrating the misalignment of incentives
• Seek to achieve some information task either storage or
processing
• Seek to minimize their cost and time spent accomplishing
these tasks
• Seek ease of use, familiarity and cost of time spent
learning new tasks
• Seek security and privacy but often dont know how to
properly evaluate or value it
Cyber Security Experts (within the legal system): are
generally seeking to fill the need of either information owners
or information product providers for some for-profit motiva-
tion. Since there is a large demand from some information
owners or product providers who are security conscious, such
as banks and tax businesses that have a large interest in this,
there is potentially a sizable incentive here, but often buyers
and sellers are uninformed and unable to properly value risks,
solutions, or providers, and often unable to pay premiums for
high quality solutions when they are identifiable. In general
cyber security experts seeking to operate clearly within the
legal system choose to operate in this role. In summary a
legal-market cyber security expert:
• Seek to identify security products to maximize profit from
customers (information owner and product providers)
• In general seek to identify risks and provide suggestions
for product development practices and security features
• Are widely varied in technical and risk assessment abil-
ities and skill levels, but are generally not easily valued
properly by the market
Cyber Security Experts ( Grey-Market ): are security ex-
perts possessing various valuable skills who seek to maximize
the potential return on their work. Due to the often vast dis-
crepancy between selling security products, bug information or
receiving bug-bounties from information product owners and
that of selling undisclosed vulnerability information and proof-
of-concepts on anonymous markets or to brokers of vulnerabil-
ities who deal with all variety of vulnerability consumers, the
latter often becomes an attractive option, offering significantly
higher potential for returns than pursuing so-called responsible
disclosure or public disclosure. In summary grey-market cyber
security experts:
• Have a unique ability to discover and leverage unknown
vulnerabilities
• Seek to maximize their return from these vulnerabilities
• Are not concerned with operating within legal and moral
boundaries
• Are widely varied in technical and risk assessment abil-
ities and skill levels, but can be clearly valued based on
the potential impact of the vulnerability for sale.
Malicious Actors (illegal activity) are generally those who
seek to leverage vulnerability information or social engineer-
ing for their own monetary, political, informational, criminal
or national gains. In general these are formed by groups with
a strong motivation to participate in one of these acts to
increase power, money, or control in some community. These
groups are often well funded and can be involved in highly
profitable enterprises where a specific high-impact enabling
vulnerability provides an extremely high value proposition
to them. For instance a single vulnerability for the proper
system or software may provide a group access to millions of
sensitive records, information, or otherwise which may enable
significant amounts of follow-on profitable illegal activity. If
used properly, a vulnerability may be used numerous times
without disclosure or diminishing value over time. Upon
disclosure, value may remain high if there is little incentive,
motivation or knowledge to patch effected systems quickly. In
summary malicious:
• Seek to steal, modify, disrupt, remove, or otherwise
tamper with private information
• Place a large incentive on cyber security experts to
provide undisclosed vulnerabilities
• Pose risks to both information owners private informa-
tion, and information product providers product integrity
and security
III. THE SOLUTION: CORRECTING INCENTIVES
Research into solving problems into the cyber security
dilemma has been principally focused on technical problems
and technical countermeasures. This has resulted in a num-
ber of promising techniques which do improve security and
have been valuable. Stack guards, memory protections, role
based access control, containers, ISA-enhancements, formal-
methods, and other technical solutions have done much to
advance the field, but adoption and deployment of best practice
methods is abysmally slow such that much of this research
from a practical users perspective is irrelevant or extremely
slow to reach market. This class of technical methods un-
fortunately tends to live well below the visibility of most
information product providers when making design and soft-
ware decisions, let alone the information owner’s level. It is
unfortunately the norm that decision makers for such infor-
mation products are either unqualified, apathetic, or unwilling
to undertake the extra effort or expense of making the most
prudent technologic choices to promote security. It’s hard to
fault them to some extent since there is little customer pressure
to do so, users and information owners generally dont know
any better and have little if any visibility into such choices
made by product providers.
To fundamentally address these issues and enhance security
for information owners and information product providers in
this system we need to better inform consumers and product
providers by providing crystal clear consensus valuations of
both risks and costs associated with information systems and
technical measures to secure them.
This is no trivial task, as real knowledge in such risk
valuation is extremely rare and contentious among numerous
parties. Unfortunately we have very little accountability or
incentive at the moment to ensure that experts in the field
are held accountable to their recommendations, endorsements,
and so called wisdom in the field. Previous work has suggested
cyber-risk insurance [4] [5], and this is available today, but due
to the poor ability of a single entity to accurately evaluate risk
without a market consensus it must be priced too high for
general use to make sense. [3]
Many of these same qualities could be said for insight into
valuation of equities, risk assets, and other financial products.
Generally the solution to pricing such assets has fallen to free
market systems as our best current approach. Allowing those
with confidence in future valuations of assets to stake positions
which benefit them proportionally to their confidence and
investment in such positions is one relatively well understood
way to allow all parties to contribute and benefit from, given
good information, a robust free market system.
By establishing better quantified risks for information prod-
ucts, we allow insurers to begin to offer informed risk products
to consumers, allowing for risk policies which pay out some
premium upon the loss of privacy or compromise of specific
information. Given that this is a more predictable event,
consumers will be influenced by policy premium and product
providers will be influenced to best engineer their systems to
minimize premiums and incentivize customers to their product
offering. By allowing a 3rd party insurance outlet, we avoid the
issue of information product risk compensation negligence, in
which information product companies simply can not tolerate
a default on information risk of their product, and disappear
and cease to provide service upon an insecure product being
once compromised. We believe that one system that might
significantly improve the functioning of the current cyber
security ecosystem is that of introducing a market system for
establishing confidence in certain information products. By
doing so we allow a number of critical effects which drastically
change the ecosystem, outlined below.
Information Owners: Selection of products which the
market generally endorses as secure products, without need
for understanding deep technical details. Selecting products
which deliver needed capabilities with minimum risk policy
premiums and select premium sizes in accordance with their
personal risk tolerance.
Information Product Developers: Gain an incentive to
seek real technical means and organizational practices to
significantly bolster their market-evaluated risk and security
measures. Wish to provide technical means which minimize
risk, and minimize risk policy pricing for risk instruments of
their customers for using their products.
Security Experts: Perhaps the most significant effect, se-
curity experts with actual impactful security enhancing tech-
niques, or security experts having discovered significantly
impactful vulnerabilities in narrow or widely used systems can
benefit from them by trading positions which will reap major
financial rewards from a public release of such a vulnerability,
and then releasing them publicly and openly. This is an option
far superior to selling them privately and without disclosure to
malicious actors, and has the potential to dwarf the incentive
for doing so through the collective risk valuation of a product.
Information Security Insurance Providers: Lastly we
introduce the concept of an information security insurance
providers, whom the information owner relies on to advise
Figure 2. Our updated version of our cyber-security ecosystem cycle including the proposed institutions of market based risk valuations in information
products as well as information security insurance providers operating with these collaborative valuations
(potentially through premium pricing) on which information
product owners products to use, while providing some level
of monetary risk compensation for the leak and release of the
users sensitive information. This is an entity which largely
does not exist right now, but with better quantified market-
agreement on risk levels of various providers and technical
means could serve an important role in guiding consumers to
safety. My personal belief is that such a system is yearning
to exist in the current time, but without better market agreed
upon risk and loss valuations, any company doing so would
either be foolish or need to charge absurd premiums to serve
such a role.
IV. CYBER-RISK ARBITRAGE
The primary method by which we propose to correct the
incentive system is that of introducing a market mechanism
of cyber-risk speculation or arbitrage. That is, introducing
market-priced risk instruments which allow consumers to
easily assess the level of risk associated with each product,
allowing them or privacy insurance companies to take steps
to price and insure privacy risk at the level appropriate for
information and individuals, and by providing a quantitative
financial benefit to information service providers for building
to and investing in risk mitigation strategies through the returns
of and their confidence in their risk backed instruments.
By allowing cyber security experts to directly transfer tech-
nical knowledge into market pricing knowledge through arbi-
trage and speculation, and possible public information release,
we offer a greater outlet than ever before for pricing assets in
line with the reality of their security. We begin to remove grey-
market and low-knowledge distortions which plague the whole
ecosystem by hiding exploits from the general public, and
by helping to inform general decision making quantitatively
without requiring heavy technical expertise.
V. REDUCING GREY-MARKET ACTIVITY AND MALICIOUS
ACTORS
Economists have long discussed the pros and cons of
prohibition, resulting in grey markets for illicit goods. Typical
current and past grey markets consist of alcohol, drugs,
weapons, and prostitution. The morality of these items aside,
the economic evidence is often that prohibitions are not
effective, do not work, and largely empower and make wealthy
those willing to accept the risks of engaging in criminal
enterprise, and those who they pay to make this possible.
Grey markets are grey for two reasons:
• The sale or activities in question are illegal and thus carry
a large risk upon them.
• Consequently such markets generally operate with lower
visibility, consumer knowledge of competitive pricing
distributions, and with few informed product option to
make safe choices on their own, making them grey.
While there has been discussion of creating a formal grey-
market through the use of export regulations in so called cyber-
munitions lists to formalize the first of these two reasons, it is
largely not yet applicable and bears no domestic implications
and faces a huge barrier of technical implementation feasibil-
ity. The second however is exactly what we have before us. A
market in which very few actors are setting prices in closed
transactions, the vast majority of people are uninformed as to
the risks, technologies, capabilities, and ultimately the choices
they must make to ensure their security.
Therefore, to reduce and improve the functionality of this
market for security and privacy, we must do three things.
• Make security valuation an open process where multiple
skilled valuation entities may clear to help price the
market intelligently.
• Allow consumers to make educated decisions when
choosing security products based on market valuation of
risk.
• Provide incentive for technical experts to achieve max-
imum profit by assisting the legal market to best func-
tion for themselves, consumers and information product
providers.
VI. INDUSTRY PATH FORWARD
The process for establishing such a market place is yet to
be determined, this could take the place of a privately run
market trading in potential disruption events, or a government
facilitated market institution. Legal or consume rating require-
ments could rapidly incentivize the adoption of such a system
for consumers, and in general, market insurers and security
experts should follow as they both begin to see and be able to
measure and predict the value in various arbitrage scenarios.
Once this happens, this system should have a positive self-
reinforcing effect, which tends to make the system stronger
by ensuring all parties of aligned interests.
If this takes the form of a privately run market, we certainly
see the incentive for being a market maker in an early
established system. For providing a market making service,
there exists significant potential to profit off transactions in an
early, and fundamentally-necessarily growing marketplace as
it becomes larger and more liquid during the adoption curve.
VII. CONCLUSION
The problem of cyber-security will largely always be an
economic problem. Until enough collective self-interest in se-
cure products and services is aligned into a single functioning
market entity, the incentive of security researchers to engage
with malicious actors in the sale of cyber capabilities, whether
through legal or illegal means, will continue to far outweigh
the alternative.
It is critical that for this market to function, risk-valuation
both of information product providers and the software and
configurations they use become a distributed and market-based
system, allowing all experts to partake in pricing and imparting
their knowledge through the practice of buying or selling risk
instruments relating to products or companies of interest.
Providing such an option allows the global cyber-security
system to select computer security experts with the most
successful risk valuation abilities and vulnerability knowledge
to help contribute to security rather than to insecurity while
potentially greatly increasing the incentive for providing such
a security role. It provides an important method for which
both information owners and information product providers
can look to market guidance for their choices in software,
companies, and practices followed to minimize their own risk
exposure and minimize insurance premiums.
Lastly it serves to significantly increase the cost to malicious
actors of funding and participating in cyber-crime by creating
a functioning market system able to price in publicly disclosed
information and create major price competition for the use of
undisclosed security information.
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